MD 191: Our conclusions on rewarding outperformance and handling under performance
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MD191

TO ALL MANAGING DIRECTORS OF
WATER AND SEWERAGE COMPANIES
AND WATER ONLY COMPANIES

25 March 2004


OUR CONCLUSIONS ON REWARDING OUTPERFORMANCE AND HANDLING UNDER PERFORMANCE

In MD187 we set out our proposals to refine and enhance the current incentive regime and to introduce new incentives to encourage the very best companies to make further improvements in efficiency.

We also explained how costs would be shared between company and customers where the company had found it necessary to undertake exceptionally large investment in maintaining its infrastructure between periodic reviews. This letter reports on the outcome of consultation. It should be read alongside MD187.

We consider that the incentive systems amended in 1999 to reward capital expenditure outperformance and incremental outperformance on operating expenditure have worked well. We therefore propose to build on those systems rather than amend them fundamentally. Our proposals provide a clear framework within which companies can take management decisions knowing the benefits that will follow from successful implementation. The incentive based rewards will only affect price limits and bills from April 2010 following the next periodic review in 2009. By then, the post of Director General of Water Services will have been replaced by the Water Services Regulation Authority under the provisions of the Water Act 2003. Although I cannot formally bind that successor body, I have no doubt that it will honour the undertakings given in this letter, which are designed to stimulate managers in the best performing companies to innovate and become more efficient in the period 2005-2010.

The only part of these proposals which potentially could directly affect price limits and bills in the forthcoming period 2005-2010 is the new approach dealing with exceptional under-performance in capital expenditure not reflected in the earlier price limit assumptions. This new rule places a limit on the current ceiling on investment by service test set down in our methodology paper 'Setting water and sewerage price limits for 2005:10 Framework and approach' (paras 8.11 to 8.16).

The consultation in MD187 stimulated a lively debate, informed also by our feedback on companies' draft business plans. Whilst companies generally supported the objective of improving incentives, most were concerned about the use of relative efficiency techniques to identify the top performers. At annex A we summarise and analyse the responses.

We have already given our initial view on the consultation in our report on Water and sewerage service unit costs and relative efficiency 2002-03 published in January 2004. Our key conclusions are:
  • Additional benefit from April 2010 for further outperformance by the best performing companies from 2005-2010
    Many companies lack confidence in our approach to identifying relative efficiency and believe that it fails to provide a sufficient basis for identifying those companies meriting further incentives. We have again considered these objections, which are a matter of long standing debate with the industry. We remain convinced that the basis of assessment is sufficiently firm to identify the best performers. We will therefore introduce the enhanced incentive for the best companies and apply it to operating expenditure for those companies graded as band A in the 2003-04 operating expenditure relative efficiency modelling and for capital expenditure for all companies assessed as band A under the cost base applicable to the current review.

    We will apply two levels of enhanced benefit based on the total outperformance in the qualifying years. Companies we assess this year to be at or near the performance frontier will receive an additional benefit equivalent to 50% of the total outperformance in the 2005-10 period. For companies in 'band A' but not at or near the frontier the new additional benefit will be 25% of the total outperformance. We will publish this information in our draft and final determinations.
  • Improvements to the current incentive mechanism
    We recognise the force of some of the arguments designed to improve and simplify the existing outperformance incentive. We will:
    - apply the operating expenditure incentive allowance using the 'additional five years model' as used for capital expenditure;

    - calculate the standard operating expenditure outperformance benefit on incremental outperformance in qualifying years [see annex B for an explanation of the mechanism to be used];

    - retain the depreciation adjustment in the calculation of capital outperformance.

    After considering the objections to some proposed changes which would have introduced greater complexity we will retain:

    - the current method of rewarding outperformance in capital expenditure through the regulatory capital value;

    - the current arrangements for incentives in the area of infrastructure renewals expenditure; and

    - we will not adopt simple smoothing, as originally proposed, for all the mechanisms.

    We look to the Water Services Regulation Authority to

    - take changes in operating costs associated with 'relevant changes of circumstance' and notified items that were not included in price limits into account when calculating operating expenditure outperformance benefits; and

    - apply the outperformance rewards on a post-financeability basis from 2010 (as we do now for the overall performance assessment of companies).
  • Exceptional underperformance
    We will apply the rule for exceptional underperformance as set out in the paper accompanying MD187. This rule will apply with effect to expenditure undertaken in the period since 2000-01.

    We will provide advice on whether proposals for supplementary capital investment would meet our criteria for logging up or specific inclusion in the regulatory capital value.

A list of respondents is at annex C to this letter and the non-confidential responses are available in the Ofwat library.

While we have no specific proposals to change or improve the outperformance incentives beyond those discussed in this consultation we will keep the matter under review. In particular we will review the performance of individual companies to improve our understanding of the appropriate scale of the enhanced incentive for the best companies that could be applied for future review periods from 2010.



PHILIP FLETCHER

Encs

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