



Outcome delivery incentive rates for Bristol Water following recalibration based on the company’s menu choice

This schedule sets out Bristol Water’s recalibrated outcome delivery incentive rates following the company’s menu choice. It is these incentive rates which the company should use during the 2015-20 price control period. The other elements of the outcome delivery incentives remain the same as in the final determination company-specific appendix (e.g. the units of measurement and the rules of application).

Incentive rates in **red** are those which have changed following recalibration i.e. those which differ from the final determination company-specific appendix.

Wholesale Water

Performance Commitment	Penalty rate following recalibration	Reward rate following recalibration
A1: Unplanned customer minutes lost	0.7109	0.4587
A2: asset reliability – infrastructure	Penalty rate 1 – deteriorating assessment: 1.848	
	Penalty rate 2 – marginal assessment: 0.616	
A3: Asset reliability – non-infrastructure	Penalty rate 1 – deteriorating assessment: 1.907	
	Penalty rate 2 – marginal assessment: 0.636	
B1: Population in centres >25,000 at risk from asset failure	£40.42	£19.09

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C1: Security of supply index (SOSI)		
C2: Hosepipe ban frequency	0.043	
D1: Mean zonal compliance	0.284	
D2: Construction of Cheddar treatment works – algae removal	Penalty rate 1 – solution not delivered: 8.978	
	Penalty rate 2 – solution delayed: 0.753	
E1: Negative water quality contacts	0.005772	0.001107
F1: Leakage	0.895	0.437
G1: Meter penetration (%)	0.034	0.032
H1: Total carbon emissions		
H2: Raw water quality of sources		
H3: Biodiversity index		
H4: Waste disposal compliance		

Household Retail

Performance Commitment	Penalty rate following recalibration	Reward rate following recalibration
G2: Per capita consumption		
I1: Percentage of customers in water poverty		
J1: Service Incentive Mechanism (SIM)	Ofwat determined	Ofwat determined
J2: General satisfaction from surveys		
J3: Value-for-money		
K1: Ease of contact from surveys		
L1: Negative billing contacts		