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**Severn Trent Water – Adjusting for  
actual performance in 2019–20:  
Blind year adjustment, final decisions**

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## Contents

1.	Introduction .....	3
1.1	Background .....	3
1.2	The PR19 blind year draft proposals .....	3
1.3	Summary of Severn Trent Water response .....	4
1.4	Section 13 Consultation notice .....	5
2.	Final decision on PR19 blind year adjustment.....	6
2.1	Our final decisions on PR19 blind year interventions .....	6
2.2	Implementing the PR19 blind year adjustments.....	10
2.3	Change in price controls .....	13
2.4	Profiling of PR19 blind year adjustments.....	14
A1	Appendix 1 Reconciliation of PR14 incentives for 2015–20 for Severn Trent Water .....	16

# 1. Introduction

This document sets out our final decisions on the reconciliation for Severn Trent Water Limited (Severn Trent Water) for the 2019–20 charging year. It includes our final determination under Part 3A of Condition B of the level of change to the price controls in respect of the company’s performance in that year against its performance commitments and outcome delivery incentives (ODIs) and the blind year adjustment (TBYA) to be included in the Revenue Forecasting Incentive (RFI) formula. The specific changes, and our reasons for these are set out in full in this document.

In September 2020, we published our PR19 blind year draft proposals in [Severn Trent Water – Adjusting for actual performance in 2019–20: Blind year adjustment](#) (the PR19 blind year draft proposals). This chapter presents an overview of the approach we have taken in developing, consulting, and reaching a final position on our PR19 blind year final decisions.

## 1.1 Background

In PR14, we set mechanisms to incentivise companies to do the right thing for their customers during 2015–20. These financial incentives cover cost efficiency, outcomes performance, revenue forecasting, customer service, water trading and land sales. In setting the 2019 periodic review (PR19) final determinations<sup>1</sup>, we applied reconciliation adjustments to revenues for the 2020 to 2025 period and to the regulatory capital value (RCV) to take account of how companies performed against these incentive mechanisms in 2015–20.

Many of these mechanisms required data for the last year of the price control period, 2019–20 (the blind year), to assess the financial payments between companies and customers. When the 2019 periodic review (PR19) was completed in December 2019, this financial year had not finished. As a result, companies provided forecast data, which we considered and adjusted as necessary, for inclusion in the PR19 final determinations. Companies reported their actual performance for 2019–20 alongside their Annual Performance Reports (APRs), submitted to Ofwat by 15 July 2020.

## 1.2 The PR19 blind year draft proposals

In September 2020, we published our PR19 blind year draft proposals which presented an overview of our assessment of the difference between the 2019–20 performance assumed in the PR19 final determinations and actual 2019–20 performance. It set out the extent to which, for each company, the revenues and RCV adjustments included in the PR19 final determination for 2019–20 needed to be adjusted to reflect actual performance<sup>2</sup>. It also

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<sup>1</sup> The full suite of PR19 final determination documents are available [here](#).

<sup>2</sup> Our approach to the reconciliations, is set out in the [‘PR14 reconciliation rulebook’](#) (the ‘reconciliation rulebook’).

presented our draft proposals regarding any interventions we intended to make, and the rationale for these.

Our published PR19 blind year draft proposals comprised a suite of documents to provide transparency to water companies and other interested stakeholders regarding our decisions and associated rationale. This included an overview document presenting a summary of our proposed sector wide blind year adjustments, an annex for each company presenting their adjustments and interventions, and supporting models for each company.

This document presents our PR19 blind year final decisions with respect to our assessment of the difference between 2019-20 performance assumed in the PR19 final determinations and the actual 2019-20 performance for Severn Trent Water. It sets out:

- the extent to which revenue and RCV for the incentive mechanisms specified in section 1.1, that were presented in the PR19 final determinations, will need to be adjusted to reflect actual performance in 2019-20;
- details of the controls to which these adjustments will apply; and
- the adjustments that will be made ‘in period’ (during 2020-25) or as part of the 2024 price review process (during 2025-30).

As set out in [‘Adjusting for company actual performance in 2019-20 - Blind Year adjustment, Overview’](#), we designated all of the PR14 performance commitments with financial incentives as being in-period for the purpose of applying blind year adjustments for differences between the 2019-20 forecast and actual performance figures. In the PR19 blind year draft proposals we set out that we expected any adjustments from the 2019-20 forecast, to account for actual figures to be modest and that these adjustments should not significantly impact bills. We noted that each company had responsibility for taking measures to smooth the impact for their customers if any impact is larger than originally expected. Further details regarding the responses we received, our final decisions and how / when the PR19 blind year adjustments will be made are presented in Chapter 2.

We have adopted a similar approach to the PR19 blind year draft proposals for our final decision, so alongside this document, we have published final models for each reconciliation, and for the overall RCV and revenue adjustments.

### **1.3 Summary of Severn Trent Water response**

Severn Trent Water raised four main issues in its response to the blind year draft proposals. The first was an update regarding the ‘W-D1 Improvements in river water quality against WFD criteria’ performance commitment recognising the potential interventions that we proposed with respect to the removal of outperformance payments in this area. The second was around its residential retail modification factors, where the company highlighted that it had calculated its retail revenue adjustment in line with its licence and expressed a concern that

Ofwat appeared to have diverged from this. The third was a request for the ODI adjustment to be deferred by one year, recognising that the Severn Trent Water blind year ODI adjustments were material and that this could cause significant unnecessary bill volatility for customers. And the final comment related to an issue with the ODI difference model. Each of these issues is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

## 1.4 Section 13 Consultation notice

Alongside the PR19 blind year draft proposals, we published a [Section 13 consultation notice](#)<sup>3</sup> which proposed licence changes to allow for any revenue associated with the blind year reconciliation of totex menus to be applied in period by including it in the blind year adjustment figure for the Revenue Forecasting Incentive (RFI) formula.

Our PR19 blind year draft proposals were presented on the basis that the proposed licence modification, as set out in the consultation notice, would be implemented ahead of the 15 November 2020 deadline for ODI determinations. We set out that, if the proposed licence modifications were not made, the blind year revenue adjustments for totex menus would not be corrected for until the 2024 periodic review (PR24).

Severn Trent Water accepted the modification, so any revenue adjustment associated with the blind year reconciliation of totex menus continue to be included in the blind year adjustment figure for the RFI formula in our final decisions.

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<sup>3</sup> Consultation under section 13 of the Water Industry Act 1991 on proposed modifications to Condition B of the licences of 17 water companies.

## 2. Final decision on PR19 blind year adjustment

This chapter presents our assessment of the blind year adjustment for Severn Trent Water, provides an overview of comments submitted in response to our PR19 blind year draft proposals and confirms our PR19 blind year final decisions regarding the application of adjustments to the company.

### 2.1 Our final decisions on PR19 blind year interventions

Each company was required to submit, alongside their APR, its view of the impact that actual reported 2019–20 performance would have on its PR19 revenue allowances when compared to the forecast level of performance that was included as part of its PR19 final determination. Using this information we completed an assessment of the required blind year adjustment.

In making this assessment, we reviewed Severn Trent Water’s blind year submissions and, where appropriate, sought clarity on company information. Where necessary we proposed to intervene to ensure the blind year adjustments were appropriate. Following our assessment of responses we can confirm that we will apply the proposed interventions for Severn Trent Water that were set out in our blind year draft proposals. We note that in the blind year draft proposals we also highlighted potential interventions on W-D1 (improvements in river water quality against WFD criteria), and we can confirm that we do not intend to apply any interventions in this area. Our final decisions are summarised in table 1 below and the following section presents an overview of our decision and the associated rationale.

**Table 1 Blind year adjustment interventions (2017–18 prices unless otherwise stated)**

Incentive	Intervention(s)
<b>Outcome delivery incentives (ODIs)</b>	We are intervening to increase the underperformance payments on ‘S-A1 internal sewer flooding’ and ‘S-A2 external sewer flooding’
<b>Residential retail revenue</b>	We are intervening to set new modification factors for Severn Trent Water to reflect the changes to its regulated business that took place in 2018.
<b>Wholesale revenue forecasting incentive mechanism (WRFIM)</b>	No interventions
<b>Totex</b>	No interventions
<b>Land sales</b>	No interventions

#### 2.1.1 ODI revenue and RCV adjustments

In our PR19 blind year draft proposals, we proposed to apply underperformance payments (of –£0.5 million 2012–3 prices, net of tax) for the ‘S-A1 Internal sewer flooding’ and ‘S-A2

external sewer flooding’ performance commitments. We noted that in its 2019–20 APR Severn Trent Water had explained that it was using new evidence and methodologies in its process to determine the number of sewer flooding incidents to exclude from these performance commitments. The company’s revised approach resulted in a small number of additional sewer flooding incidents being excluded from the performance commitments (less than 1% of the total incidents). We reviewed the evidence provided and reached the view that expansion of these methodologies did not represent a material improvement for customers. We also set out that the company had provided insufficient evidence of how the methodologies had been applied and to demonstrate the robustness of these methodologies.

In our PR19 blind year draft proposals, we also presented a potential intervention related to the removal of outperformance payments for the ‘W-D1 Improvements in river water quality against WFD criteria’ performance commitment. If applied, it would remove £0.750 million (2012–3 prices, net of tax) of outperformance for each intervention that is not delivered in excess of the performance commitment level. We noted that Severn Trent Water had reported an outperformance payment for 2019–20 for W-D1 but that the Environment Agency had advised us that the company had provided insufficient evidence of delivery of reported improvements at Battlefield Brook, Upper Worfe and Meece Brook. While the potential intervention was not included in the PR19 blind year draft proposals, we flagged its possible inclusion in our final decision if the Environment Agency remained of the view that required improvements had not been delivered satisfactorily. Recognising this, we required the company to engage the Environment Agency, ahead of our final decision, to demonstrate satisfactory delivery of these improvements.

## Summary of responses

In its response to the blind year draft proposals regarding the sewer flooding performance commitments Severn Trent Water commented that some differences of opinion are inevitable – for example, whether a particular event or series of weather events can be considered exceptional.

On the potential removal of outperformance payments for the W-D1 performance commitment Severn Trent Water highlighted that the three schemes identified by Ofwat were still under discussion with the Environment Agency. In a follow-up email received on 19 October 2020, the company confirmed it had received confirmation from the Environment Agency that Severn Trent Water had effectively delivered the AMP6 Water Resource schemes for Battlefield Brook, Upper Worfe and Meece Brook.

## Final position

We will apply underperformance payments (of –£0.5 million 2012–3 prices, net of tax) for Severn Trent Water’s ‘S-A1 Internal sewer flooding’ and ‘S-A2 external sewer flooding’ performance commitments.

On the basis of the response received from Severn Trent Water, and the associated confirmation provided by the Environment Agency, we will not intervene to remove any outperformance payments for the W-D1 performance commitment.

## 2.1.2 Residential retail revenue adjustments

In our blind year draft proposals we set out that we were intervening to set new modification factors in residential retail for Severn Trent Water, in the same way that we did as part of the PR19 past delivery reconciliation. We considered this intervention to be necessary as the modification factors that the companies had provided did not reflect the exchanges between Severn Trent Water and Hafren Dyfrdwy of parts of their regulated businesses that took place in 2018.

### Summary of responses

In its response to the blind year draft proposals Severn Trent Water set out that it had calculated its retail revenue adjustment in line with Schedule 1 (A) of Condition B of its appointment (Licence). The company expressed a concern that Ofwat appeared to have diverged from the Licence where the retail modification factors are clearly set out in Schedule 1 Table 4. As such, Severn Trent Water suggested that Ofwat should keep to the retail modification factors in the licence.

### Final position

The residential retail control is an average revenue control that provides companies with a revenue allowance per customer (also referred to as a modification factor). In line with these provisions, allowed revenue is set by multiplying the modification factor by forecast customer numbers. Once outturn customer numbers are observed, the difference between the actual and forecast customer numbers is multiplied by the modification factor and added to the initial allowed revenue. The price controls for 2018-20 were included in the Severn Trent Water and Hafren Dyfrdwy licences in 2018 because of the reallocation between them of parts of their regulated businesses. In its response to the blind year draft proposals, Severn Trent Water notes that we have diverged from these provisions.

We note the concerns expressed by Severn Trent Water and, in response, we would highlight that the divergence in modification factors from those set out in the licence was implemented to account for the reallocation, between Severn Trent Water and Hafren Dyfrdwy, of parts of their regulated businesses that took place in 2018. To this end, the PR19 final determinations<sup>4</sup> specified that we were intervening to include an updated modification factor for allowed retail service revenue in 2018-19 and 2019-20. The rationale for our decision was that the PR14 modification factors did not reflect the updated customer bases of

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<sup>4</sup> [PR19 final determinations: Severn Trent Water – Accounting for past delivery final decisions](#)

the two companies and therefore it was appropriate to use a weighted average that reflected the reallocation of parts of their regulated businesses.

As part of the blind year process, Severn Trent Water submitted updated data on outturn customer numbers. Using the same methodology as in PR19, we used these updated customer numbers to calculate updated modification factors for 2019–20. For these reasons our final decision remains unchanged from the blind year draft proposals.

### **2.1.3 Discrepancy between the tables and models**

In its response to the blind year draft proposals, Severn Trent Water highlighted that it had been unable to reconcile the adjustment to wholesale wastewater revenue between the consultation document and the revenue adjustment feeder model.

#### **Final position**

We have amended the ODI difference model to ensure that interventions from this model effectively flow through into the revenue and RCV adjustments feeder models.

### **2.1.4 RPI-CPIH wedge**

A number of companies noted that in the PR19 final determinations the RPI-CPIH wedge was set on the basis of forecast inflation and should be updated to reflect 2019–20 outturn inflation values. In this respect, the companies highlighted that the blind year adjustment, as calculated, did not appear to take into consideration the impact of changes in actual inflation on the March 2020 closing RCV.

Following an assessment of the responses received, we reviewed the models (a) used in the PR19 final determination, (b) used in the PR19 blind year process and (c) consulted on as part of the PR19 reconciliation rulebook. Our review highlighted that the points raised by these companies were valid and that further RCV and revenue adjustments are required to reconcile the difference in the RPI-CPIH wedge that was forecast in the RCV feeder models. We have included extra calculations in the PR19 blind year adjustments model to calculate the further RCV adjustment that will be included as part of the PR24 midnight adjustment. The associated revenue adjustment for the difference in respect of the return companies would have been allowed during the 2020–25 period had the closing 31 March 2020 reflected actual rather than forecast 2019–20 inflation has not been included in the PR19 blind year adjustments model. We will calculate the revenue difference in respect of the return at PR24 and adjust it for the time value of money within an appropriate model in the PR24 modelling suite.

## 2.2 Implementing the PR19 blind year adjustments

In the PR19 rulebook consultation, we set out how we expected blind year adjustments to be applied. In Annex 2 to the notification of the PR19 final determination for each company, we designated all PR14 performance commitments as in-period to allow us to adjust company price controls to reflect performance in 2019-20. Annex 3 of that notification also sets out the RFI formula for 2020-25 in relation to the network plus and water resources price controls. It includes a blind year adjustment factor that allows PR19 blind year revenue adjustments for other PR14 reconciliation mechanisms to be taken into account.

We have included extra calculations in the PR19 blind year adjustments model to convert, using CPIH, the wholesale revenue blind year adjustments to the price base required for input to the revenue forecasting incentive (RFI) model. The RFI model inputs are defined as 'base year 2019/20 prices' that is the November prior to 2019-20 (i.e. November 2018). Companies should use these values as inputs to their RFI models.

Our approach is intended to ensure that any adjustments are made as close as possible to when customers are impacted by company performance. Table 2 below summarises the blind year adjustments for Severn Trent Water and when these will feed into customer bills while table A1-4 in appendix A1 presents the company's total blind year adjustment (TBYA) allocated to each price control.

Table 2: Summary of blind year adjustment (£ million, 2017-18 FYA CPIH deflated: PR19 base year prices)

Type of adjustment	Total Value (£m)	Control				When it applies
		Network Plus	Water resources	Residential retail	Bioresources	
Total ODI revenue adjustments	-17.664	-18.082	0.421	0.000	-0.003	In 2021-22 through in-period determination of price controls
WRFIM revenue adjustments	-2.499	-2.499	N/A	N/A	N/A	Over the last four years of the 2020-25 period and captured within the RFI formula blind year adjustment (BYA)
Water trading revenue adjustments	0.000	0.000	0.000	N/A	N/A	
Totex menu revenue adjustments	5.232	5.232	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Other revenue adjustments	0.000	0.000	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Residential retail revenue adjustments	-0.914	N/A	N/A	-0.914	N/A	End-of-period revenue adjustment, captured within the Residential Retail model blind year adjustment (BYA)
Total non-ODI revenue adjustments	1.819	2.733	0.000	-0.914	N/A	
<b>Total revenue adjustments</b>	<b>-15.845</b>	<b>-15.349</b>	<b>0.421</b>	<b>-0.914</b>	<b>-0.003</b>	
Totex menu RCV adjustments	14.562	14.562	N/A	N/A	N/A	At PR24, flowing through 2025-30 price controls
Land sales RCV adjustments	-0.409	-0.409	N/A	N/A	N/A	
ODIs RCV adjustments	0.000	0.000	0.000	N/A	N/A	
Other RCV adjustments	0.000	0.000	N/A	N/A	N/A	
2019-20 RPI-CPIH wedge RCV adjustments	-22.832	-20.592	-0.963	N/A	-1.276	

Blind year adjustments, Final decision, Severn Trent Water

Type of adjustment	Total Value (£m)	Control				When it applies
		Network Plus	Water resources	Residential retail	Bioresources	
<b>Total RCV adjustments</b>	<b>-8.679</b>	<b>-6.440</b>	<b>-0.963</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>-1.276</b>	

Note

No changes are being proposed to the bioresources price control. All bioresource revenue and RCV adjustments are applied to the wastewater network plus control.

## 2.3 Change in price controls

As outlined in section 2.2, different elements of the blind year adjustment are recovered in different ways. With the exception of the ODI revenue adjustments, all adjustments are either recovered by companies across the remaining four years of the price control period through the RFI formula, or recovered in the following price control period. For PR19 blind year ODI revenue adjustments, the starting assumption is that these will be recovered in 2021-22 through a performance measure adjustment determination.

Table 3 sets out the changes to price controls for Severn Trent Water to account for the blind year ODI revenue adjustments<sup>5</sup>. We have used the PR19 in-period adjustments model to calculate changes to price controls and the version of the model we use is published alongside this document.

**Table 3: Summary of changes to the price controls for the PR19 blind year ODI revenue adjustments**

Control		2020-21	2021-22	2022-23	2023-24	2024-25
Water resources (K factor)	PR19 final determination		3.45	6.02	5.95	-7.80
	Revised		3.45	6.02	5.95	-7.80
Water network plus (K factor)	PR19 final determination		-0.50	-1.63	-1.70	0.28
	Revised		-0.50	-1.63	-1.70	0.28
Wastewater network plus (K factor)	PR19 final determination		-1.85	-1.29	-0.98	1.02
	Revised		-1.85	-1.29	-0.98	1.02
Bioresources (sludge) - Revised total revenue (£m) – 2017-18 Nov CPIH prices	PR19 final determination		76.857	77.205	77.395	77.744
	Revised		No change	No change	No change	No change
Residential retail – Revised total revenue (£m) – nominal prices	PR19 final determination		105.067	106.062	107.008	107.922
	Revised		105.067	106.062	107.008	107.922

To note, in calculating the blind year adjustment, we calculate the adjusted PR14 reconciliation for all relevant mechanisms for the whole of the 2015-20 period using actual

<sup>5</sup> The starting revenue allowances for the Water resources, Water and Wastewater network plus price controls do not change – only the K factors. For the residential retail price control we will adjust allowed revenue by a fixed amount instead of changing the value of any of the elements set out in the final determination of the price control. No changes will be made to the Bioresources price control. All wastewater ODI revenue adjustments will be applied to wastewater network plus.

2019-20 performance data. We then calculate the difference between this updated view and the equivalent information from the PR19 final determination.

## **2.4 Profiling of PR19 blind year adjustments**

IN 20/06 explained that we did not expect companies to submit proposals on spreading ODI adjustments across charging years. This is because we were expecting ODI adjustments to be relatively small (as they would only relate to the variance from forecast performance) and because the blind year revenue adjustments that are applied through the RFI formula provides some flexibility to companies to manage volatility.

In the PR19 blind year draft proposals we set out that if, after reviewing our proposals, the company was of the view that there was a case for spreading the blind year adjustment across two or more years, it should include proposals in its response.

### **2.4.1 Profiling of blind year adjustments – summary of response**

In its response to the blind year draft proposals, Severn Trent Water proposed a one year deferral of its ODI adjustments. Reflecting on its experience of in-period ODIs during 2015-20, the company suggested that there is a need to balance the immediacy of incentives against the impact on bills. Severn Trent Water noted that customer engagement had revealed a strong preference to avoid temporary reductions in bills that would be followed by sharp increases. It also pointed out that the reduction in bills from deferring ODI adjustments would help mitigate upward pressure on bills as a result of the reduction in non-household demand it is forecasting for 2020-21. It also notes CCWater support for its proposed approach.

### **2.4.2 Profiling of blind year adjustments – final decision**

We accept Severn Trent Water's proposal to defer part of its ODI revenue adjustments.

Severn Trent Water referred to CCWater research, which it said showed that customers consistently show a strong preference for a steady bill profile. It also explained that it had gauged customer views with direct research via its online customer platform TapChat. The company explained that this revealed a preference for companies to avoid temporary reductions and sharp increases in bills - around 60% of customers overall and a slightly higher proportion of customers in the lower socio economic groups.

Severn Trent Water discussed the implications of the proposed adjustment for the blind year for Severn Trent customers' bills with CCWater. It said that CCWater agreed with its view that customers would prefer a more stable bill profile. CCWater has confirmed that it supports the proposal. Severn Trent Water explained that it wanted to defer the ODI revenue adjustment to

2022-23 because it expected a number of factors could affect bills in 2022-23 including the impact of unusual consumption patterns this year across all its customers (which will be adjusted for in 2022-23) and potential in-period ODI payments related to 2020-21 performance.

It noted that, if revenue were not deferred to 2022-23, while the increase in average bills in 2022-23 might be below 5% (which might be deemed acceptable), increases for some groups of customers might be higher. In particular, it noted that without intervention unmetered customers might see a decrease of around 3% in 2021-22 followed by an increase of more than 7% in 2022-23. Severn Trent Water also argued that the likely low level of inflation this year (which feeds into bills in 2021-22) also supported its approach<sup>6</sup>.

On balance we consider that it is appropriate to allow bill profiling in this case. We have used the in-period adjustments model to defer revenue.

The in-period adjustments model calculates changes to a company's price controls with a two year lag. For the blind year adjustment we calculate changes to a company's price controls in 2021-22 to reflect the underperformance and outperformance payments it has incurred in 2019-20. Normally, ODI payments are applied in full, however, some payments can be deferred to the following or any subsequent charging year – in this case 2022-23 – if Ofwat considers it to be appropriate.

We have applied the requested value of the deferrals to the relevant price controls in the 'Voluntary deferrals' section of the in-period adjustments model inputs. We have deferred all of the outcome delivery incentive payments in Severn Trent Water's blind year adjustment; a net value of £15.392m in underperformance (2012-13 prices, net of tax), which we consider to be consistent with Severn Trent Water's proposal.

The in-period adjustments model applies a time value of money adjustment to the deferred payment using the 2020-25 allowed return on capital of 2.92%. This value is an output of the model and will be applied at the in-period determination of 2020-21 ODIs (to be made by November 2021). We would normally expect the deferral to be for one year only. However, Severn Trent Water can ask for another deferral at the time of the 2020-21 in-period determination. At this time it will need to provide appropriate justification and evidence on whether a deferral is required, taking account of payments due from performance in 2020-21 that would also be applied by an adjustment to the company's revenue allowance for 2022-23 and wider expectations on charges. This enables us to take a rounded view on the likely revenue impact on customers and companies in the relevant year.

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<sup>6</sup> The PR19 reconciliation rulebook consultation, stated an expectation that 2020-25 ODI adjustments would need to exceed  $\pm 1\%$  of notional regulatory equity, for us to defer the excess to a subsequent year, to mitigate extreme cashflow and bill volatility. However, companies can seek to defer any amount of ODI payments, but will need to provide sufficient justification and evidence. Our decisions on any such request will be made in light of the company's expected performance and our statutory duties. Severn Trent Water's blind year ODI revenue adjustment is below this threshold. We also note that the adjustments relate to PR14 performance commitments set under the PR14 framework, not the Pr19 framework.

## A1 Appendix 1 Reconciliation of PR14 incentives for 2015–20 for Severn Trent Water

Table A1-1: Reconciliation of PR14 incentives by PR14 price control (£ million, 2017–18 FYA CPIH deflated: PR19 base year prices)

	Wholesale water			Wholesale Wastewater			Residential retail		
	PR19 FD	Company BY view	Ofwat BY view	PR19 FD	Company BY view	Ofwat BY view	PR19 FD	Company BY view	Ofwat BY view
<b>Revenue</b>									
Outcome delivery incentives	-4.9	-6.1	-6.1	159.7	143.4	142.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
Residential retail revenue	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-7.5	-8.4	-8.4
Wholesale revenue forecasting incentive mechanism	-11.5	-16.2	-16.2	-12.7	-10.5	-10.5	N/A	N/A	N/A
Totex	34.4	39.6	39.6	-20.2	-20.2	-20.2	N/A	N/A	N/A
Land sales	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential retail service incentive mechanism	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-15.7	0.0	-15.7
PR09 blind year adjustments	-7.2	-7.2	-7.2	1.7	1.7	1.7	N/A	N/A	N/A
CIS RCV inflation correction	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Water trading	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Other adjustments	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Total</b>	<b>10.8</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>128.5</b>	<b>114.4</b>	<b>113.9</b>	<b>-23.2</b>	<b>-8.4</b>	<b>-24.1</b>
<b>RCV</b>									
Outcome delivery incentives	-4.8	-4.8	-4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential retail revenue	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Wholesale revenue forecasting incentive mechanism	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Totex	127.8	149.4	149.4	-198.0	-204.8	-204.8	N/A	N/A	N/A

Blind year adjustments, Final decision, Severn Trent Water

	Wholesale water			Wholesale Wastewater			Residential retail		
	PR19 FD	Company BY view	Ofwat BY view	PR19 FD	Company BY view	Ofwat BY view	PR19 FD	Company BY view	Ofwat BY view
Land sales	-10.4	-11.0	-11.0	-15.3	-15.0	-15.0	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential retail service incentive mechanism	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
PR09 blind year adjustments	10.7	10.7	10.7	1.0	1.0	1.0	N/A	N/A	N/A
CIS RCV inflation correction	-71.3	-71.1	-71.1	-79.9	-79.7	-79.7	N/A	N/A	N/A
Water trading	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Other adjustments	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A	N/A	N/A
2019-20 RPI-CPIH wedge RCV adjustments	N/A	N/A	-11.5	N/A	N/A	-11.4	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Total</b>	<b>52.1</b>	<b>73.2</b>	<b>61.7</b>	<b>-292.2</b>	<b>-298.6</b>	<b>-309.9</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>

Note:  
 These adjustments are made in line with the 'PR14 reconciliation rulebook' and reflect the interventions explained in summary in table 4.11 in 'Severn Trent Water final determination' and in detail in 'Severn Trent Water - Accounting for past delivery final decisions'.  
 Revenue in these tables may not reconcile to the lines for 'Reconciliation of PR14 incentives, 2020-25' in table 4.12 in the 'Severn Trent Water final determination'. This is because the values in table 4.12 reflect adjustments made in the financial model for the tax treatment of the wholesale revenue forecasting incentive mechanism and totex reconciliations, and net present value profiling of the reconciliation adjustments over the 2020-25 period used for setting the allowed revenue. The treatment of tax and profiling are explained in the 'PR14 reconciliation rulebook'. The revenue adjustment values shown in tables 1 and 2 below assume a single year adjustment in the first year of the 2020-25 period.  
 As well as replacing forecast performance with actual performance in 2019-20, the company's blind year view and our final blind year decisions set out in the above table also replace forecasts of inflation in 2019-20 with actual RPI and CPIH indices.

**Table A1-2: Ofwat's view of PR14 reconciliation adjustments for 2015-20 by PR19 price control (£ million, 2017-18 FYA CPIH deflated: PR19 base year prices)**

	RCV adjustments				Revenue adjustments				
	Water resources	Network plus water	Network plus wastewater	Bioresources	Water resources	Network plus water	Network plus wastewater	Bioresources	Residential Retail
Outcome delivery incentives	0.0	-4.8	0.0	N/A	12.7	-18.8	142.8	0.1	0.0
Residential retail revenue	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-8.4
Wholesale revenue forecasting incentive mechanism	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-16.2	-10.5	N/A	N/A
Totex	12.5	136.8	-204.8	N/A	N/A	39.6	-20.2	N/A	N/A
Land sales	-0.9	-10.1	-15.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential retail service incentive mechanism	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-15.7
PR09 blind year adjustments	0.9	9.8	1.0	N/A	N/A	-7.2	1.7	N/A	N/A
CIS RCV inflation correction	-6.0	-65.1	-79.7	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Water trading	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.0	0.0	N/A	N/A	N/A
Other adjustments	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A	N/A	0.0	0.0	N/A	N/A
2019-20 RPI-CPIH wedge RCV adjustments	-1.0	-10.5	-10.1	-1.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Total</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>56.1</b>	<b>-308.7</b>	<b>-1.3</b>	<b>12.7</b>	<b>-2.6</b>	<b>113.8</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>-24.1</b>

Note: These totals exclude any outcome delivery incentive revenue adjustments for business retail performance commitments.

**Table A1-3: Ofwat's view of midnight adjustments to RCV by PR19 price control (£ million, 2017-18 FYA CPIH deflated: PR19 base year prices)**

	RCV adjustments			
	Water resources	Network plus water	Network plus wastewater	Bioresources
PR14 reconciliations	6.5	66.6	-298.6	N/A
IFRS adjustments	0.5	2.5	0.5	0.0
2019-20 RPI-CPIH wedge RCV adjustments	-1.0	-10.5	-10.1	-1.3
Midnight adjustments to RCV	6.1	58.6	-308.2	-1.3

Note:  
The IFRS16 adjustments are unaffected by 2019-20 inflation and out of scope of the blind year reconciliation. They remain unchanged from the 2019 final determination.  
The 2019-20 RPI-CPIH wedge RCV adjustment reconciles the difference in the RPI-CPIH wedge that was forecast in the 2019 final determination RCV feeder model.

**Table A1-4: Ofwat's view of the blind year adjustment for 2019-20 by PR19 price control for use in the revenue forecasting incentive model (£ million, 2017-18 FYA CPIH deflated: PR19 base year prices)**

	Revenue adjustments			
	Water resources	Network plus water	Network plus wastewater	Bioresources
Wholesale revenue forecasting incentive mechanism	N/A	-4.713	2.214	N/A
Totex	N/A	5.287	-0.055	N/A
Water trading	0.000	0.000	N/A	N/A
Other adjustments	N/A	0.000	0.000	N/A
<b>Total blind year adjustment (TBYA) for use in the RFI formula</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.574</b>	<b>2.159</b>	<b>N/A</b>

**Ofwat (The Water Services Regulation Authority)  
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